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The Facts  
On 15 October 2010, the Appellant company, Nyimba Investments, obtained an 
insurance policy from Nico Insurance. The policy insured against risk on all real 
and personal property, and against business interruptions and the loss of profit 
of the Appellant and its group companies trading in Zambia. On 12 September 
2011, a fire gutted the property of the Appellant. At the time of the fire, the 
titleholders of the property were Gulam Ahmed Adam Patel and Ayyub Adam 
Patel who traded under the name: “Nyimba Filling Station and Supermarket”. 
The two were also shareholders in the Appellant company. 
 
The Appellant claimed on the policy for material damage, and the claim was 
settled by the Respondent, Nico Insurance. However, the claim for business 
interruption and loss of profit was later rejected by the Respondent when it 
was discovered that the destroyed property was not registered in the name of 
the Appellant Company, but instead in the names of two of its shareholders. 
The Respondent repudiated the policy for lack of insurable interest, refused to 
honour the claim for business interruption and loss of profit, and sought to 
recover the money it had already paid for material damage.  
 
The Appellant took the matter to the High Court. The High Court held that 
the Appellant made a representation that it owned the property that was the 
subject of the claim, when it did not in fact do so, and further that the 
Appellant's misrepresentation was fraudulent. This rendered the insurance 
policy void, and the claim on the policy untenable. It is against this 
judgment that the Appellant appealed. 
The legal issues to be determined could be summarized as follows: 
1. What constitutes an insurable interest? Is an insurable interest co-extensive 
with legal or equitable ownership of the subject matter of insurance? 
2. Is it misrepresentation, and therefore a breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith, for the insurer to insure the property as its own, when that 
property is in fact owned by the shareholders of the insured? 
3. Is an insurer who accepts and continues to accept premiums from the 
insured, while knowing that it is entitled to decline to insure the risk, or to 
repudiate a claim on account of breach of warranty or misrepresentation, 
estopped from pleading breach of warranty or misrepresentation?
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The Holding  
On Issue 1 above, the Supreme Court held that;  
(a) The insurable interest requirement does not necessarily require an 
insured to own the insured property outright. A less direct interest is 
enough. It may be enough that the insured is in possession of the 
property, or simply that it would suffer loss if the property were to be 
damaged.  
(b) The determination of insurable interest should depend on a careful 
reading of the contract of insurance in each case.  
(c) While authorities of apex courts in England will remain persuasive on 
courts in Zambia, authorities will not be applied without consideration 
of the circumstances in which they were decided.  
 
On Issue 2, the Court held that;  
(a) Insurance contracts are contracts of utmost good faith. Each party to 
the contract should not only disclose all the relevant information 
truthfully, but should also refrain from misleading the other party to 
the contract.  
(b) Misrepresentation must be material and must lead to inducement. 
(c) A misrepresentation is material if, first, it influences the prudent 
insurer’s decision to take up the risk, and second, if it influences the 
premium to be fixed for such risk. The test for materiality is an 
objective one made by reference to the attitude of a hypothetical 
prudent insurer. 
(d) A representation is influential if it weighs on the critical decision to 
insure or not to insure, and if to insure, on what terms. The insurer will 
only be entitled to avoid a policy if they can show that they were 
induced by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by the insured, to 
enter into the contract. 
 
On Issue 3, the Court held that the issue of estoppel did not arise, given the 
Court’s finding that the Respondent was bound to honour the claim. 
 
Significance  
General  
The Court is to be commended for deviating from the narrow interpretation 
of insurable interest under English law as espoused in Macaura v. Northern 
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Assurance1 and Luceana v. Craufurd.2 Instead the Court leaned in favour of 
authorities that follow the reasonable expectancy theory and broad 
interpretation of insurable interest. The Court’s holding that the insured had 
an insurable interest, despite the fact that it had no legal title registered in its 
name, is sound.3 
 
Since insurance companies and underwriters do, in some cases, seek to 
evade their legal obligations on the grounds of a lack of an insurable 
interest, it is the duty of the Court to lean in favour of an insurable interest, 
where possible. After insurance companies have accepted premiums, the 
objection that there was no insurable interest is often a technical objection 
and one which has no real merit.4  
 
The above notwithstanding, the Court in its analysis of the Feasey v. Sun 
Life Assurance Company case, should have considered adopting Waller 
L.J.’s5 three-step test for the validity of a policy under the rules of insurable 
interest, which was laid down as: 
(a) What is the subject-matter of the policy?  
(b) What is the interest of the insured in the insured subject-matter? 
(c) Does the policy cover the assured’s interest?  
The adoption of the above test would have made future determination of 
matters dealing with insurable interest easier.  
                                                
1  (1925) A.C. 619 
2 (1802) 3 Bos & Pul. 75 
3  An insurable interest can be said to exist if: the assured has legal or equitable 
title to the subject matter; or if the assured is in possession of the subject matter; 
or if the assured is not in possession of the subject matter but may be either 
responsible for, or suffer loss in the event of, any damage to the subject matter. 
Glengate-KG Properties Limited v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society 
Limited (1999) 2 All E.R. 487 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Corporation of 
Canada (2003) Lloyds Rep. I.R 637. Though in Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance 
(1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501, the court rejected the view that insurable interest had 
to be based upon the assured being the equitable or legal owner of the property 
in question, and held that an insurable interest in property might arise merely 
because the assured owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the 
property. 
4  Brett M.R in Stock v Inglis (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 564, affirmed (1885) L.R. 10 App. 
Cas 263; Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (2003) Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 
637 
5  Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 637 
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The Time When an Insurable Interest Must Exist 
The Court at pages J44 to J46, reviewed the policy document and arrived at 
the conclusion that the Appellant was within the contemplation of insurable 
interest under the definition of “property insured” in the policy document. 
The Court did not address in detail nor provide guidance on the time when 
an insurable interest must exist. However, inference from the decision 
shows that it must exist at the time of contract.  
 
Different jurisdictions have taken different views on the timing question. 
The opinions from the majority of the American courts hold that insurance 
on property is valid when an insurable interest in the property exists at the 
time of the loss.6 The basis of this position is that if the loss only occurs to 
the insured with an insurable interest in the damaged property, then no loss 
can exist when the property lacks the prerequisite insurable interest at the 
time of the loss.7 Common law courts however, appear to have never 
reached consensus on whether the insurable interest must exist at the time of 
contract formation. In Sadlers Co. v. Badcockk8 the court held that the 
insured must have an insurable interest in the property both at the time of 
contract formation and at the time of loss.9 
 
In addition, the premium is recognized as an insurer’s consideration for 
assuming the insured’s risk in exchange for the insurer’s obligation to pay 
proceeds.10The consideration may fail, however, if the insurer assumes no 
risk at the time the premiums are paid because, even though the insurer 
promises to insure against the risk of loss, the insured risk does not exist 
until the insured actually obtains insurable interest.11 Given that the 
insurable interest is an essential element for the valuable consideration of an 
insured’s payment of premium, requiring its existence only at the time of 
                                                
6  Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 Issue 4 - 749 
7  E.g., Dairyland Ins. Co v. Hawkwin, 292 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D. Iowa 1968) as 
cited in the Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 749 
(finding insurers could not deny coverage on grounds that insured, who was 
listed as owner, had no insurable interest because, even though the insured’s 
son-in-law possessed the car and the insured intended to transfer ownership to 
the son-in-law when insured received payment, a bona fide sale had not occurred 
at the time of loss). 
8  2 Atk. 544, 26 ER 733 (1743).  
9  Robert Jerry II, Understanding Insurance Law; 43 (2nd ed. 1996) 
10  The Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 749 
11  Ibid. 
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loss materially therefore conflicts with the general principle of contract 
law.12 In Germany for instance, the legislators there have endorsed the 
principle that the insurable interest must exist through the entire duration of 
the insurance contract. Article 80 of the German Insurance Contract Act for 
example provides that “the policyholder shall not be obligated to pay 
insurance premium if no insured interest exists when the insurance cover 
[age] commences.” The Zambian Insurance Act is silent on this issue, and 
the Court did not clearly address this in its judgment.  
 
An insurable interest can be said to exist if: the assured has legal or 
equitable title to the subject matter; or if the insured is in possession of the 
subject matter; or if the insured is not in possession of the subject matter but 
may be either responsible for, or suffer loss in the event of, any damage to 
the subject matter. Glengate-KG Properties Limited v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Limited (1999) 2 All E.R. 487 Feasey v Sun Life 
Assurance Corporation of Canada (2003) Lloyds Rep. I.R 637. Though in 
Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501, the Court 
rejected the view that insurable interest had to be based upon the insured 
being the equitable or legal owner of the property in question, and held that 
an insurable interest in property might arise merely because the assured 
owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the property. 
 
Overall, the Court’s disposal of the issues was sound, and in accordance 
with long established principals of law. In developing their analysis, the 
Court provided a useful historical analysis of the concept of insurable 
interest, and undertook a cross jurisdictional comparison of how apex courts 
in other jurisdictions have, in recent times, dealt with the subject of 
insurable interest. The ambiguity on timing notwithstanding, the broader 
construction of the concept of insurable interest is a welcome development.  
 
                                                
12  Malcom Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty-First 
Century 36 (2007). 
